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videos by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014 showing beheading of Westerners (Martinez and Abdelaziz, 2014) .
While the role of visual propaganda in social media has become more significant and widespread, there has been insufficient empirical or theoretical research on this topic. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature by conducting content analysis of images posted on the official Facebook pages of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces. The latter, often called the Syrian Coalition, has represented Syrian opposition groups in international meetings (Bouchard, 2014) . We analyze 
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Visual propaganda and framing
Visual imagery has long been a key component of propaganda (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2015; Green, 2014; Rose, 2012) . From ancient coins emblazoned with images of emperors in Rome, political posters during World Wars I and II, to graphic Internet videos of the Islamic State beheading Westerners in 2014, visuals are used to create "awe and respect" and "a sense of potency" (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2015: 327) . That is, visual imagery helps maximize desired effects by helping elicit emotions necessary for persuasion. For this reason, visuals have been an important aspect of propaganda research (Fahmy et al., 2014; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2015; Rose, 2012) .
In studying visual propaganda, it is important to take into account framing devices used to enhance persuasiveness of the message. Framing refers to the ability of communicators to influence an audience's understanding of an issue based on the way they present the issue (Entman, 1993; Gamson, 1992; Melki, 2014; Reese, 2007; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007) . For example, Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) argue that framing is modes of presentations communicators adopt in "presenting relatively complex issues in a way that makes them accessible to lay audiences" (2007, p. 12 ).
Structures of narratives or story lines are important aspects of framing, as they help construct and define issues using salient aspects of a social reality that is already understood by an audience. In this sense, Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 143) defined a frame as "a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them." According to Reese (2007: 150) , frames are "organizing principles that Visual Propaganda on Facebook 4 are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world." In cognitive psychology, it has been shown that people use frames to build structure and understand their realities as more of a personal narrative (Kinder, 2007) .
In developing organizing narratives for framing, communicators often make a certain aspect of an issue more salient and influence how the receiver of the information understands or interprets the issue presented. Entman (1993: 52) argues that framing consists of selecting some facets of "a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation." Framing also works by influencing people as to which associations should receive greater weight in relation to others (Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997) .
Therefore, frames can play a vital role in stimulating opposition to or support for an event or issue by representing specific ideology. In short, frames may guide how people understand the world and thus form judgments.
Visuals play a significant role in presenting an issue in a way that makes selected aspects of the issue salient (Borah, 2009; Brantner et al., 2011; Domke et al., 2002; Green, 2014; Greenwood and Jenkins, 2015; Schwalbe et al., 2008; Schwalbe and Dougherty, 2015) . For example, media outlets used different framing devices in covering the U.S.-led invitation of Iraq in 2003 emphasizing particular aspects of the Iraq war (Aday et al., 2005; Schwalb et al., 2008) .
A content analysis of images featured in the U.S. mainstream media showed that the visual framing changed from conflict to human interest during the campaign's first five weeks (Schwalbe et al., 2008) . Another study of framing in television coverage of the 2003 Iraq war found that the image of Hussein's statue in Firdos Square falling served as an effective mechanism for presenting a victory frame and "provided a less climactic sense of the war" (Aday et al., 2005: 327) . Schwalbe and Dougherty's (2015) analysis of visual frames used by Time,
Visual Propaganda on Facebook 5
Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report in covering the 2006 Lebanon War showed that the news magazines focused on the war's negative impact on Lebanon and its people by using military conflict and human interest frames. A study of visual framing of the 2011-2012 Syrian conflict showed that conflict framing was dominant in images featured in news and public affairs magazines though peace framing was also salient in public affairs magazines (Greenwood and Jenkins, 2015) . Based on an analysis of visual propaganda related to the German invasion of Belgium during the First World War, Green (2014) argued that visual representations and rhetorical frameworks were used to manipulate public opinion in Britain.
Propaganda in the social media age
Recent developments in information and communication technologies (ICTs) have significantly influenced techniques of propaganda (Cull et al., 2003; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2015) . The emergence of social media is particularly relevant in this context, as popular social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have allowed individuals and organizations to directly interact with target audiences without having to rely on traditional intermediaries such as mass media. Social media refers to a group of applications that allow people to interact with one another and create, share, and engage user-generated content using digital network technologies (boyd and Ellison, 2007; Ellison and boyd, 2013; Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010) . Different types of social media serve different purposes. For example, platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram are geared more toward helping build and maintain social relationships. Other platforms like YouTube, Flickr, and Pinterest emphasize more on content sharing aspects such as video sharing or photo sharing.
With more than one billion active users on Facebook and 320 million on Twitter worldwide (Facebook, 2015; Twitter, 2015) , social media is an important venue for domestic and international political activities. A report shows that as of 2013 about 83% of the 193 member Visual Propaganda on Facebook 6 countries of the United Nations had a presence on Twitter, and 68% of all heads of state and government had personal accounts on the micro-blogging site (Burson-Masteller, 2014) . As Jowett and O'Donnell (2015: 303) put it, "Increasingly, world leaders are becoming astutely aware that their every action is being critically examined within this new electronic arena, and like the actors that most politicians are, they are adjusting their postures and policies to make the most of their exposure." The emergence of social media poses challenges for political leaders, as people have a far greater number of channels through which they can receive and share information. Social media-based information warfare has been prominent in conflict situations.
For example, the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas' Alqassam Brigades actively used Twitter during the 2012 Gaza conflict to build international support for their own side (Cohen, 2012; Seo, 2014) .
These are in line with characteristics of the networked information societydisintermediation, nonmarket peer production, and decentralization of information-facilitated by ICTs (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2010; Shirky, 2011) . Increased disintermediation and decentralization in information production and diffusion means that propaganda agents no longer need to go through mass media to spread their messages to target audiences; they can go directly to an audience by utilizing their own social media sites. That is, propaganda agents can more easily mobilize the public to amplify their messages if they can identify appropriate channels and content. Moreover, they can identify and work with social influencers to serve as "channels of communication to broader audiences" through social media platforms (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2015: 395) . The current study continues in this tradition and examines social media-based propaganda images used during the latest conflicts in Syria that began with popular uprisings against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2011.
Syrian conflicts and social media
Visual Propaganda on Facebook 7 Social media platforms played a significant role in facilitating the so-called Arab Spring-popular political movements in some Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria since 2010 (Halverson et al., 2013; Howard and Hussain, 2011; Kirkpatrick and Sanger, 2011; Shehabat, 2012) . Social collaborative networks, facilitated by these popular social media sites, helped activists mobilize citizens, organize protests, and network with activists in neighboring countries (Howard and Hussain, 2011; Kirkpatrick and Sanger, 2011) . Social media also provided channels for both activists and citizens to express dissatisfaction with the status quo and abuse of power by political leaders in their country and thus to create a collective identity against oppression and around resistance (Howard and Hussain, 2011; Polletta and Jasper, 2001 ). It was not only activists but also dictators who understood the critical role of social media in information warfare in this age of online social networking. This has created a dynamic wherein political messages are exchanged via popular social media sites between activists and those who currently hold political power. (Erlich, 2014) . The popular uprising in Syria began in March 2011, with pro-democracy demonstrators gathering in the southern city of Derra in protest against the government's arrest and torture of several teenagers who wrote anti-government graffiti on a school wall (BBC, 2015) . These protests were in line with other freedom movements in the MENA region around that time (Harding and Arthur, 2013; Shebahat, 2012) . Syrian government forces responded by firing on the demonstrators. This was followed by more citizens joining the pro-democracy protests. Demonstrations spread across Syria with hundreds of Visual Propaganda on Facebook 8 thousands taking to the streets by July 2011 (BBC, 2014 (BBC, , 2015 . Protesters demanded an end to the authoritarian practices of the Assad regime and the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad (Harding and Arthur, 2013; Shebahat, 2012) . Opposition groups were armed and fought against the Syrian government's crack down on protesters. A report commissioned by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that the number of conflict-related killings in Syria reached more than 191,000 as of April 2014 (Price, Gohdes and Ball, 2014) . In particular, the Assad regime tried to further restrict and control information by attacking media organizations and journalists. For example, Syrian government forces raided the nonprofit Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression and arrested its officials (Freedom House, 2014) .
The Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) reported that at least 81 journalists have been killed in Syria since the 2011 uprising, "making it the second deadliest conflict for journalists" since the committee began comprehensive records in 1992. With the geopolitical significance of Syria and deepening humanitarian crisis, the Syrian conflict generated international discussions in social media arena (Callaghan et al., 2014) .
Since popular uprisings against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime in 2011, both the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime have actively used multiple social media channels including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube to counter the other's claims and to promote their own agenda within and outside the country (Curry, 2013; Sadiki, 2012; Shehabat, 2012) . The increased importance of social media in Syria is in line with the significant growth in the number of Internet users in the MENA region (Internet World Stats, 2015; Seo and Thorson, 2012) . As of December 2014, about six million people in Syria used the Internet with the penetration rate of 26%, compared with 30,000 Internet users in 2000 (Internet World Stats, 2015) .
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For opposition forces in Syria, social media has been an essential tool to expose "brutalities" of the Assad regime to the international community and to diffuse their revolutionary or resistance messages to people in and outside of Syria. In particular, Facebook, the world's most popular social media site (Facebook, 2015) , played an important role in networking and information dissemination. As of March 2015, there were a dozen of active Facebook accounts that claim to be accounts of the official Syrian oppositions. These sites include Facebook pages named "National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces," "Syrian National Council," and "Local Coordination Committees of Syria" (Facebook, 2015) . The number of Facebook "likes" that these sites received as of March 2015 ranged from about 900 to more than 110,000. Posts on these sites include content mostly in Arabic or English though some are in other languages such as French and Turkish. When the Assad regime intensified its ban on foreign press coverage of the Syrian situation and its censorship of social media within Syria, Syrian diaspora activists have supported the Syria-based opposition's social media efforts by telling stories of civilian sufferings in Syria via social media (AndenPapadopoulos and Pantti, 2013).
Recognizing the importance of social media in controlling its citizens and its image outside the country, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government has also capitalized on these new communication channels. The Assad regime used the Syrian Electronic Army, dubbed as "Assad's cyber warriors," for its social media-based propaganda warfare (Harding and Arthur, 2013; Shehabat, 2012) . They closely monitored and tracked down dissenters and shut down websites critical of the Assad regime. In addition to these Internet censorship activities, the Assad regime has involved in more subtle propaganda efforts by creating accounts on popular social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. As of March 2015, the Syrian President's Office garnered over 210,000 Facebook "likes," 13,900 Twitter followers, and Visual Propaganda on Facebook 10 44,000 Instagram followers. Despite an increased number of Syrian civilians killed, injured, or displaced during the conflicts (UNHCR, 2014), the Syrian government has shared, via these social media sites, photos emphasizing normalcy in the country-for example, the Syrian President engaging in regular domestic and diplomatic activities and Syrian First Lady Asma alAssad interacting with or caring for civilians and military personnel.
Research questions
As discussed above, information and communication technologies (ICTs) played an important role in the Syrian revolution, with both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime and opposition forces actively using social media sites to promote their agendas (Sadiki, 2012; Shehabat, 2012) . The recent conflict in Syria has been described as "the most socially mediated in history" (Callaghan et al., 2014: 1) . In particular, Facebook was widely used in propaganda efforts both by the Syrian President and by Syrian opposition forces in terms of number of posts and amount of audience engagement. Both sides actively shared on Facebook imagery, a form with cultural and historical significance in the region, to promote their agendas. In this sense, content available on the Syrian President Facebook page and the leading Syrian Coalition Facebook page provides an important opportunity to understand how social media-based visuals are used during times of conflict. Previous research on the role of visuals in propaganda and persuasion has demonstrated the importance of analyzing thematic elements and framing devices in examining the topic (e.g., Aday et al., 2005; Coleman, 2010; Goldstein, 2009; Green, 2014; Greenwood and Jenkins, 2015; Schwalbe et al., 2008; Schwalbe and Dougherty, 2015) . Based on our review of previous studies and preliminary research on this topic, we pose the following research questions. Coding scheme. Previous studies in this area as well as grounded theory approach guided development of categories for coding themes and frames (Brantner et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2003; Goldstein, 2009; Seo, 2014; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) in their own territories being destroyed by attacks from the other side. The unity category covered images aimed at promoting solidarity with foreign allies as well as among their own military and political forces or civilian supporters. The humanity theme covered images emphasizing efforts to protect innocent civilians. In addition to the prominent theme of each image, whether the message was mainly aimed at domestic or international audiences was also coded.
Three categories were used in analyzing types of propaganda frame featured in Facebook images: overt vs. covert, analytical vs. emotional, and human interest vs. non-human interest.
Previous research on propaganda guided the establishment of these items (Cull et al., 2003; Goldstein, 2009 ). The overt frame covered images that explicitly promote their own agenda or blame the other side for the ongoing crisis and chaos labeling it as an "evil" or aggressor. For example, the Syrian opposition Facebook page posted an image linking the Assad regime with the self-proclaimed Islamic State would fall under this category. In comparison, the covert frame was for images posted by the Syrian President and the Syrian opposition that implicitly promote their agendas. An example of the covert frame would be an image of the Syrian President receiving praise from Syrian citizens or foreign leaders conveying his national or international support despite the growing calls from Syrian opposition forces and the international community to step down. The analytical frame captured images that focused on facts, statistics, or analytical interpretations of how their own side is protecting Syrian people, how the other side is harming Syria, and how their own side is prepared to defeat the other side. In comparison, the emotional frame covered images intended to evoke emotions such as compassion for their own side and animosity toward the other side. Finally, the human interest frame was used to capture images that highlight specific individuals who suffer from attacks from the other side and help Facebook users associate themselves with those individuals and their stories.
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The structural features coded were: (i) whether the image was a still photo, video, or graphic illustration, (ii) whether any caption accompanying an image was in English, Arabic, or both English and Arabic, or other language, (iii) and whether a character appearing in the image was child or adult.
In coding still photos, illustrations, and videos, we followed methods used by previous studies of visual content analysis (Keith et al., 2009 (Keith et al., , 2010 Rose, 2012) . The coders considered the entire image and caption associated with it in determining the most prominent theme, main frame, and primary character in still photos and graphic illustrations. When a still photo or a graphic illustration included multiple sub-images, our coding focused on the most dominant image-the largest image (Keith et al., 2009) . For a video, the coders watched the complete video and used the dominant image-the image featured longest in the video-in analyzing those aspects (Keith et al., 2009 (Keith et al., , 2010 . The videos analyzed in this study were relatively short with an average length was about three minutes.
Inter-coder reliability. For an inter-coder reliability test, two trained coders fluent with both English and Arabic coded the same 10% of the sample images from each Facebook page (Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005) . Inter-coder reliability was determined using Scott's pi.
The inter-coder reliability score for theme and frame was .91 and .93, respectively. The intercoder reliability score for the main character was .98, image type .99, caption language .99, and audience reactions .99.
Data analysis. The SPSS software package was used for data analysis. Basic descriptive statistics and Chi-square tests were used to examine differences between the Syrian President's [ There was also a statistically significant difference between the two Facebook pages in Indeed, images that use emotional or human interest frames received a significantly higher amount of audience reactions on both the Syrian President's Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition Facebook page. As discussed above, images including these frames portrayed personal stories of specific individuals, and these approaches have shown to be effective in influencing the ways people think about particular issues (Brantner et al., 2011; Fahmy et al., 2014; Goldstein, 2009; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2015) .
[ Table 2 About Here] Table 3 , these differences in the levels of audience reactions to images with different types of theme were statistically significant based on a series of analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests.
Image type and audience reactions (RQ3)
[ Table 3 In terms of types of frame and audience reactions, images that use emotional or human interest frames received a significantly higher amount of audience reactions on both the Syrian President's Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition Facebook page (Table 4) . As discussed above, images including these frames portrayed personal stories of specific individuals, and these approaches have shown to be effective in influencing the ways people think about particular issues (Brantner et al., 2011; Fahmy et al., 2014; Goldstein, 2009; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2014) .
The two Facebook pages differed in terms of audience reactions to overt vs. covert frames. On the Syrian President's Facebook page, covert frame images generated a greater level of reactions Visual Propaganda on Facebook 20
than overt frame images. In contrast, overt frame images were more popular than covert frame images on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page.
[ Table 4 About Here]
Discussion and Conclusion
Communication networks provide affordances necessary for the flow of messages among communicators (Benkler, 2006; Monge and Contractor, 2003) . The development of the Internet as a medium for high-speed communication networks has had significant consequences for aspects of society including collaborations within and across borders, political movements, social change, and trade (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2010) . For example, social collaborative networks, facilitated by popular social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, helped activists mobilize citizens, organize protests, and network with activists in neighboring countries during the socalled Arab Spring (Kirkpatrick and Sanger, 2011; Seo and Thorson, 2012) . mediated" conflict in history (Callaghan et al., 2014: 1) . Moreover, images were particularly salient in these conflict situations, as people preferred content that is easy to understand and share.
Our results suggest that analysis of theme is an important component of visual political communication research involving social media sites. We found that there were statistically significant differences between the Syrian President's Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition The Syrian President's Facebook page generally shied away from war imagery and acknowledging the actions or political efforts of the "enemy," or opposition forces. Anytime opposition forces were mentioned, Assad characterized them as terrorists and emphasized his role in protecting his country. These images served to solidify the Syrian government's narratives that (i) President Assad fearlessly protects its people; (ii) life has continued normally throughout Syria; and (iii) Assad and his wife live in a time of relative stability in the country.
In comparison, images on the Syrian Coalition emphasized the themes of threats from the enemy, casualties of civilians, unity, and victory. Those images, often in the form of still photo or graphic illustration, explicitly expressed their messages of reviving revolution in Syria.
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Multimedia content depicted the suffering of children, women, and the elderly. At the same time, it showed these individuals engaged in acts of defiance towards the regime, such as holding signs or participating in protests. Some images also employed the religious rhetoric of "martyrdom,"
which appeals to its overwhelmingly religious audience (Halverson et al., 2013) . Many images were designed to expose government violence and torture, while inspiring solidarity and action among ordinary Syrians. Images posted to the Syrian Coalition page also attempted to connect struggles of resistance in Syria to broader social issues, including class struggles and economic problems such as homelessness and hunger. Often times, the images made an appeal to all corners of Syrian society to unite and revive the demands for democratic change, political rights, and economic improvement many protestors made during the 2011 Syrian revolution.
Images carrying the theme of causalities of civilians or military personnel generated were frequently featured on both the Syrian President's Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition This research helps us understand mechanisms and outcomes of dynamic social collaborative networks activated during conflict situations. The emergence of digital mediafacilitated social collaborative networks has brought a shift from "the mass-mediated social spaces" to "a networked public sphere" (Benkler, 2006) . Information is generated and exchanged without necessarily going through traditional intermediaries. The result is the rapid emergence Visual Propaganda on Facebook 23
and extinction of networked spaces. A consequence is that the distribution of information often becomes more decentralized, even as many of the underlying and enabling communication protocols remain largely under the centralized control of governments and large-scale service providers (themselves subject to government regulation and control). This study helps us understand characteristics of images posted on social media sites during conflicts-images that are not mediated by mass media. Most of studies in visual framing of conflict situations have focused on images featured on mainstream media (e.g., Aday et al., 2005; Greenwood and Jenkins, 2015; Schwalb et al., 2008) .
Our research shows framing is an important component of visual political communication research involving social media sites. The Syrian government used visual frames to support its narrative that President Assad is a fearless leader protecting its people and that life has continued normally throughout Syria. The Syrian opposition used various images to solidify its narrative of the Assad regime's brutality and sufferings of Syrian civilians. Moreover, this study shows that traditional frame categories remain to be relevant in analyzing social media-based propaganda images. As discussed in the Methods section, we used three propaganda frame categories-overt vs. covert, analytical vs. emotional, and human interest vs. non-human interest-guided by previous research (Cull et al., 2003; Goldstein, 2009; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2015) . These categories were pertinent in analyzing images posted to the two Facebook pages under this study.
The covert frame was prominent in images on the Syrian President [ Figure 1 About Here]
The human interest frame was also significant. This finding is in line with previous research showing human interest frame is widely used in media coverage of international conflicts (Schwalbe et al., 2008; Schwalbe and Dougherty, 2015) . The current study updates literature on framing (e.g., Entman, 1993; Melki, 2014; Reese, 2007; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007) , in particular visual framing (e.g., Borah, 2009; Brantner et al., 2011; Domke et al., 2002; Green, 2014; Greenwood and Jenkins, 2015; Schwalbe and Dougherty, 2015) . Previous studies on framing focused mostly on how mass media used framing devices-for example, conflict, peace, or human interest frames-in covering major events. By analyzing how visual frames are used in social media sites during an international conflict, this study helps us better understand how framing is adopted in a networked public space (Benkler, 2016) as opposed to mass media-mediated contexts. As discussed above, this study finds that framing categories used in previous studies were relevant, but a more diverse approach to framing is found in the networked space. Frame categories developed as part of this study should be useful for future studies in this area.
This study also contributes to enhancing our understanding of propaganda in the networked information age. While previous models of propaganda emphasized heavily on the role of mass media and one-way communication types (Cull and Welch, 2003; Herman and Chomsky, 1988) Note. According to a Chi-square test, there were statistically significant differences between the two sides in terms of prominent themes portrayed in their Facebook images (χ 2 (1, df = 6) = 69.22, p < .001).
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